Judge's guide: verify Leash in five minutes
Leash is a spending and action leash for AI agents on QoreChain. A classical key can only stop things; starting or loosening anything needs an ML-DSA-87 signature, verified on chain by pqcVerify. This page tells you where to check each claim yourself. Nothing here asks you to trust our words: every row has a command or a link.
The fest checklist
| Requirement | Where it is |
|---|---|
| Public repository, Apache-2.0 | https://github.com/David-glitc/leash (LICENSE) |
| README | README.md |
| Cover image (16:9, 1600x900) | cover.png |
| Video, under 3 minutes | 2:56, https://david-film-library.pages.dev/media/leash-demo.mp4 |
| Testnet addresses | qor1n7jzhw6pmznuzvfruwlqs6mehjfykf6sdqru99 (owner), qor18cfh4g3ryryesszuj9a23f6dvllj83c9s689ud (agent) |
| Commits during the fest | git log (every commit is dated November 2026) |
AI-Native award: AI_USAGE.md |
AI_USAGE.md: what the AI did, what the author decided, where the AI was wrong |
| Kits used | @qorechain/sdk and @qorechain/evm (verified by the fest site), hybrid transactions, key registration, scoped EVM windows, pqcVerify and pqcKeyStatus from Solidity |
Check the chain yourself (no install)
All of this is public on qorechain-diana (EVM chain id 9800). The guard and transactions below are real.
RPC=https://evm-testnet.qore.host
# 1. the v2 guard has code on chain
curl -s $RPC -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getCode","params":["0x6781ab2c589469ab91790d1a40a7de1f6d5135eb","latest"]}' | head -c 120
# 2. the transaction where the owner's real ML-DSA-87 signature was accepted by pqcVerify (status 0x1)
curl -s $RPC -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getTransactionReceipt","params":["0xd588cfa9e6f77c7a65a815a439bb0e572fed0002ecbb6dd6037d626414fd58bc"]}' | head -c 400
Check everything with one command
git clone https://github.com/David-glitc/leash && cd leash
pnpm install
pnpm verify
pnpm verify is read-only and needs no keys. It reads the live testnet and checks:
- both guards exist and their owner is the registered owner account;
- the deployed v2 bytecode equals what this source compiles to (immutables masked);
- the two
applyMandatetransactions (v1 and v2) succeeded, sopqcVerifyaccepted a real ML-DSA-87 signature; - the five adapter transactions (wrap, unwrap, vault deposit, vault redeem, swap) succeeded and each emitted the guard's
Executedevent; - the two MCP transactions (a swap and a wrap made by an MCP client) succeeded;
- the drill reports are internally consistent (15 of 15 on testnet, 16 of 16 locally).
Run the tests and demos locally
Needs Foundry, Node 22 and pnpm.
pnpm test # 46 contract tests + 30 TypeScript tests
pnpm demo:local:v2 # every adapter, then the Q-Day drill for actions (16 checks)
pnpm demo:monitor # the monitor catches a burst and an unexplained outflow and freezes with a stop-only key
pnpm mcp:e2e # an MCP client drives swaps, wraps and vaults through the server (24 checks)
What is real, and what is simulated
| Thing | Status |
|---|---|
ML-DSA-87 signature verified by pqcVerify on testnet |
Real. The owner's actual key signed; the chain accepted it. |
| Guard deployment, mandates, the five adapter actions, the MCP swap and wrap | Real transactions on qorechain-diana. |
| The "blocked" rows of the testnet drill | Simulated calls that revert as expected (eth_call). A blocked call sends no transaction. |
| Router, tokens, vault used in the testnet run | Our own test contracts. QoreSwap's router address is not published. |
| Expiry check | Proven on a local node, where time can be moved. |
| Mainnet | Not available. pqcVerify is testnet-only today. |
Where to look in the code
| File | What it is |
|---|---|
| src/LeashGuardV2.sol | The guard: payments, guarded actions, the freeze, the post-quantum-gated mandate |
| src/adapters/ | Three stateless adapters: V2 router, wrapped native, ERC-4626 vault |
| test/LeashGuardV2.t.sol | 25 tests, a fuzz test, and the attacks |
| tools/policy.ts | The plain-English compiler (a grammar, not a model) |
| tools/attack-v2.ts | The Q-Day drill: a leaked agent key and a leaked owner key |
| tools/monitor.ts | The monitor and its stop-only auto-freeze |
| mcp/server.ts | The MCP server (15 tools) |
What we did not do
We did not audit the contracts, we did not run on mainnet, and we did not build bridging. THREAT_MODEL.md lists every known limit, and FAQ.md answers the questions we expect.